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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over any 
civil action arising under the laws of the United States, including 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 6901 et seq., and the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), 28 
U.S.C. § 1350.  28 U.S.C.  § 1331 (2006).  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from any final decision of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Union.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294(1) (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether Valdez and Ventura have demonstrated standing 
under both Article III and RCRA and shown that they 
have suffered concrete personal and aesthetic injuries 
directly traceable to container #VS2078, and whether 
Friends of Responsible Trade has representational 
standing based on the injuries suffered by its two 
members. 
II. Whether this court has jurisdiction to hear Valdez’s ATCA 
claim, despite Congress and the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s extensive regulation of the export of hazardous 
waste under RCRA.  
III. Whether the district court abused its discretion in 
allowing the Environmental Protection Agency to continue 
this lawsuit after dismissing Appellants’ claims for lack of 
standing. 
IV. Whether the district court was correct in holding that the 
contents of container #VS2078 were solid waste, and 
whether the contents of container #VS2078 remained solid 
waste regardless of the container’s final destination. 
V. Whether the contents of container #VS2078 were 
hazardous waste under RCRA, thereby subjecting Green 
Recycling Group and Newtown Parent Teachers 
Association to liability for violating RCRA’s hazardous 
waste export regulations. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Friends of Responsible Trade (“FRT”) and two of its 
members, Juan Valdez and Ace Ventura, filed a complaint 
against Green Recycling Group, Inc. (“GRG”) and Newtown 
Parent Teachers Association (“Newtown PTA”) in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Union.  (R. at 3.)  
FRT, Valdez, and Ventura (together, “Appellants”) alleged that 
GRG and Newtown PTA (together, “Appellees”) exported used 
electronic devices to Sud-Americano in violation of RCRA’s 
hazardous waste regulations.  (R. at 3.)  Appellants sought civil 
penalties, an injunction against further RCRA violations and 
damages for injuries resulting from GRG and Newtown PTA’s 
export of hazardous waste.  (R. at 3.)  Valdez also sought 
compensation under the federal courts’ ATCA jurisdiction.  (R. at 
3.)  The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
intervened in the suit as a matter of right.  (R. at 3.) 
On August 31, 2009, the district court issued an order 
granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on all but one 
ground.  (R. at 13.)  The district court held that: (1) FRT and its 
two individual members lacked standing to challenge GRG’s 
export of hazardous waste; (2) the court did not have jurisdiction 
under the ATCA to decide Valdez’s personal injury claim; (3) 
despite FRT and its members’ lack of standing, the EPA had an 
independent jurisdictional basis to continue the suit against GRG 
and Newtown PTA; and (4) GRG and Newtown PTA’s export of 
hazardous waste did not violate RCRA.  (R. at 4.) 
The EPA and Appellants filed a timely appeal from the 
district court’s decision.  (R. at 1.)  The EPA appeals the district 
court’s dismissal of Appellants for lack of constitutional and 
statutory standing.  (R. at 4, 13.)  The EPA also appeals the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment on the question of 
Appellees’ liability under RCRA for the illegal export of 
hazardous waste.  (R. at 4, 13.)  The EPA requests that this court 
affirm the district court’s decision denying jurisdiction over 
Valdez’s claims under the ATCA, and the district court’s 
discretionary choice to allow the EPA to continue this litigation in 
Appellants’ absence.  (R. at 4, 13.)  This court granted review on 
September 29, 2009.  (R. at 2.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
GRG, in connection with Newtown PTA, collects used 
electronic devices (“UEDs”) from individuals, and then sells these 
devices to foreign salvagers and recyclers.  (R. at 4.)  GRG ships 
these materials abroad to foreign countries like Sud-Americano, a 
non-OECD developing country that has no regulatory scheme 
governing the recycling of UEDs.  (R. at 5, R. Attach., Oct. 16, 
2009.)  GRG collects UEDs in the United States and then ships 
them to facilities such as those owned by Geraldo Garcia, where 
they are salvaged or disassembled under unsafe and 
environmentally unsound working conditions.  (R. at 4-5.)  While 
half of the UEDs sent by GRG, by volume, are re-used in Sud-
Americano, the other half are dismantled in facilities such as 
Garcia’s.  (R. at 5.)  GRG has an open-ended contract with Garcia 
calling for potential future containers of UEDs to be sent to 
Garcia’s plant at Pacifica, Sud-Americano.  (R. at 8.) 
Garcia, whose plant received the toxic materials shipped by 
GRG in container #VS2078, hires local residents to dismantle 
those UEDs not salvaged in order to reclaim heavy metals, 
plastics, and other valuable materials.  (R. at 5.)  Garcia does not 
provide his workers, including Juan Valdez, with basic protective 
gear such as gloves and masks.  (R. at 5.)  As a result, Garcia’s 
workers were directly exposed to mercury, lead, cadmium, 
chromium, and numerous other toxins.  (R. at 5-6.)  Moreover, 
Garcia’s inadequate processing facilities, and his failure to 
properly collect, contain and manage the waste at his processing 
plants caused lead and other heavy metals to enter the ground 
and local water supply, endangering Valdez, all other local 
residents and any visitors to the area.  (R. at 6.) 
Newtown PTA collected the UEDs in container #VS2078 from 
local residents of Newtown, State of New Union, on two 
consecutive Saturdays in early June 2008.  (R. at 5.)  No money 
was exchanged when Newtown PTA collected the UEDs.  (R. at 
4.)  Newtown PTA members performed no more than a visual 
examination of the UEDs they collected before accepting them 
from local residents.  (R. at 5.)  Individuals disposing of their 
UEDs signed a form indicating that they had used the electronic 
devices in their homes and that those devices were no longer 
useful.  (R. at 5.)  After collecting enough UEDs to fill container 
#VS2078, GRG shipped them to Garcia’s plant in Pacifica, Sud-
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Americano.  (R. at 5.)  GRG’s shipment did not comply with 
RCRA’s export requirements and the company filled out nothing 
more than customs documents pertaining to container #VS2078.  
(R. at 5.) 
The UEDs in container #VS2078 included normal cell 
phones, pagers, televisions and computers.  (R. at 5.)  The bulk of 
the container was comprised of MyPhones, a product similar to 
the Apple iPhone.  (R. at 5.)  Newtown is the home of the 
MyPhone headquarters, and the company used Newtown as an 
early test-market for its product.  (R. at 5.)  The product 
performed poorly, and many local residents disposed of their 
MyPhones with Newtown PTA and GRG.  (R. at 5.)  In fact, many 
MyPhones were still in their original packaging when Newtown 
PTA accepted them as UEDs that had supposedly been “used” in 
the donor’s homes.  (R. at 5.)  In addition to performing poorly, 
MyPhones contain toxic materials.  (R. at 5.)  They are more toxic 
than iPhones, as they contain a mercury-lithium battery, lead 
and other toxins.  (R. at 5.) 
After learning that GRG’s business practice was to send 
UEDs to unregulated recycling facilities abroad, Ace Ventura, a 
United States citizen and member of FRT, investigated the harm 
affecting Pacifica and fellow-FRT member Valdez.  (R. at 4.)  FRT 
is an organization that advocates for “Responsible Trade” 
practices.  (R. Attach., Oct. 27, 2009.)  Ventura took photographs 
of the UEDs in container #VS2078 before it was exported to Sud-
Americano, including one showing three laptops labeled “Property 
of the United States Government.”  (R. at 5.)  He also filmed a 
documentary about GRG’s activities and the resulting 
environmental damage to Pacifica.  (R. at 6.)  The documentary 
highlighted the exposure of Sud-Americano workers to toxic 
waste and their resultant injuries.  (R. at 6.)  Valdez’s injuries, as 
shown in the film, include memory loss and neurological damage 
that medical experts indicate are “of the type caused by lead and 
mercury poisoning.”  (R. at 6.)  Lead and mercury were both 
present in the MyPhones shipped in container #VS2078 and 
processed at Garcia’s plant.  (R. at 5.) 
In addition to FRT member Valdez’s physical injuries, 
Ventura suffered significant emotional injuries.  (R. at 7.)  He has 
extensive experience with the town of Pacifica and is distraught 
by the gross pollution emanating from Garcia’s plant, damaging 
5
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the local environment and injuring Garcia’s employees, including 
Valdez.  (R. at 7.)  This emotional injury, as well as the significant 
environmental damage caused by Garcia’s plant, prevents 
Ventura from returning to Pacifica.  (R. at 7.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact  and . . . the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  This court 
reviews questions of law de novo.  Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 
552, 558 (1988).  Thus, this court’s jurisdiction to decide 
Appellants’ claims under RCRA and the ATCA and whether GRG 
and Newtown PTA have violated RCRA by exporting hazardous 
waste to Sud-Americano must be reviewed de novo.  The district 
court’s decision to allow the EPA to remain a party to this lawsuit 
after Appellants’ dismissal was within its discretion and should 
be reviewed for abuse of that discretion.  Atkins v. State Bd. of 
Ed. Of N.C., 418 F.2d 874, 875-76 (4th Cir. 1969). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in holding that FRT and its two 
members, Valdez and Ventura, did not have standing to challenge 
GRG and Newtown PTA’s illegal activities.  Valdez and Ventura 
have both suffered an injury-in-fact as required to show standing 
under Article III of the Constitution.  Valdez’s injury is concrete 
and directly traceable to container #VS2078.  Ventura suffered an 
aesthetic injury resulting from the environmental damage to 
Pacifica and emotional harm from witnessing the injuries 
suffered by Garcia’s workers, including Valdez.  Furthermore, 
Valdez and Ventura both have standing under RCRA’s citizen 
suit provisions.  The high probability that future harm will occur 
under GRG’s export arrangements satisfies the “to be in 
violation” requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A).  Under 
RCRA’s “cradle to grave” structure, Newtown PTA is liable for 
GRG’s handling of container #VS2078.  FRT also satisfied the 
Hunt representational standing requirements and rightfully 
brings its claim as an association. 
The district court correctly held that Valdez cannot use the 
ATCA to seek compensation for injuries caused by GRG and 
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Newtown PTA’s export of hazardous waste to Sud-Americano.  
Valdez failed to show that GRG and Newtown PTA’s actions 
violated any treaty ratified by the United States or any widely-
followed “law of nations.”  Furthermore, recognizing a new cause 
of action under the ATCA will interfere with Congress and the 
EPA’s extensive regulation of hazardous waste under RCRA and 
the Executive Branch’s management of foreign affairs. 
Even if FRT and its members do not have standing, the 
district court acted appropriately within its discretion in allowing 
the EPA to continue this litigation.  The EPA has an independent 
basis for jurisdiction under RCRA’s enforcement provisions.  In 
light of the EPA’s ability to sue independently, dismissing the 
EPA in this action will cause unnecessary delay and expense. 
The district court properly found that the contents of 
container #VS2078 were solid waste.  The UEDs in container 
#VS2078 did not lose their status as solid waste merely because 
they were shipped across international borders.  Furthermore, 
the UEDs are known to be toxic, and thus must be considered 
hazardous waste under RCRA.  The contents of container 
#VS2078 did not qualify for the household waste exception.  GRG 
and Newtown PTA failed to properly test the contents of 
container #VS2078, label the shipment as hazardous waste and 
report the shipment to the EPA, all in violation of RCRA.  They 
should be held liable for their actions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. VALDEZ AND VENTURA HAVE BOTH 
DEMONSTRATED LEGAL COGNIZABLE INJURIES 
ESTABLISHING CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY STANDING, AND HENCE FRT HAS 
REPRESENTATIONAL STANDING TO BRING THIS 
CLAIM. 
Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of 
federal courts to the resolution of “cases” and “controversies.”  
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  To bring a suit in federal court, a 
plaintiff must allege three elements: (1) a personal injury-in-fact 
that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful 
conduct and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.  
7
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  
RCRA permits any individual to commence an action in district 
court seeking enforcement of its waste disposal regulations.  42 
U.S.C § 6972 (2006).  A private party may bring suit against any 
person or entity responsible for solid or hazardous waste which 
may present an imminent and substantial danger to health or the 
environment.  Meghrig v. Kfc W., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996).  The 
district court improperly concluded that Valdez and Ventura 
failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact and therefore lacked 
constitutional standing or statutory standing under RCRA.  As 
FRT members Valdez and Ventura have demonstrated injuries-
in-fact sufficient to satisfy both Article III and RCRA 
requirements, they, and FRT, have standing to pursue its claims. 
 
A. Valdez and Ventura Have Article III Standing Because 
They Have Demonstrated  Concrete Injuries-In-Fact 
Directly Traceable To Container #VS2078. 
 
An “injury-in-fact” must be concrete and particularized, 
actual or imminent, and not conjectural or hypothetical.  
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.  Further, a plaintiff’s 
injury must be directly traceable to the defendant, and the line of 
causation between his injury and the defendant’s illegal conduct 
must not be overly attenuated.  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 
(1984). 
 
1. Ventura’s use and enjoyment of Pacifica has 
been impaired, and he suffered an aesthetic injury as a 
result of the hazardous waste emitted from Garcia’s 
plant. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff suffers an 
injury-in-fact when his aesthetic enjoyment of natural resources 
is impaired by damage wrought by environmental pollution.  
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).  Environmental plaintiffs can 
adequately show an injury-in-fact by demonstrating that they use 
the affected area and that their aesthetic and recreational 
enjoyment of the area has or will be lessened by the challenged 
activity.  Id. at 183. 
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In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), the Supreme Court recognized that a broad 
conception of standing is accorded to environmental plaintiffs.  
412 U.S 669 (1973).  In SCRAP, a group of students brought suit 
against the federal government.  Id. at 678.  The students used 
forests in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area for recreational 
purposes.  Id.  They alleged that a proposed increase in rail 
freight rates would lead to environmental degradation.  Id. at 
687.  As a result, the students’ use and enjoyment of the local 
area would be impaired by the “adverse environmental impact 
[to] all the natural resources of the country.”  Id. at 687.  The 
Supreme Court held that the students had standing.  Id. at 686. 
In Laidlaw, the plaintiffs filed a citizen suit against the 
owner of a South Carolina hazardous waste incinerator facility, 
alleging that the facility’s activities did not comply with a clean 
water statute regulating the discharge of pollutants.  528 U.S at 
176-77.  The defendant moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing.  Id. at 177.  
The plaintiffs submitted affidavits and testimony arguing that 
due to the defendant’s actions, they were unable to freely enjoy a 
nearby river for recreational purposes as they might have without 
the alleged harm.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184.  The Supreme Court 
held that these statements documented an injury-in-fact 
sufficient to support the plaintiffs’ standing.  Id. at 177. 
Under Laidlaw and SCRAP, Ventura’s alleged injuries are 
sufficient to establish an injury-in-fact.  Similar to the plaintiffs 
in Laidlaw, Ventura avers that the aesthetic and recreational 
value of Pacifica was greatly diminished by the damage caused by 
toxins that seeped into the area surrounding Garcia’s plant.  (R. 
at 6-7.)  Ventura also testified that the gross pollution emanating 
from Garcia’s operations and the sight of workers such as Valdez 
who were “obviously” injured by that pollution has caused him 
such emotional distress that he can no longer return to Pacifica.  
(R. at 7.)  As in SCRAP, Ventura is no longer able to freely use 
Pacifica as he was before Garcia’s activities damaged the local 
environment. 
Furthermore, the district court erred in asserting that 
Ventura’s tears were “crocodile tears” merely because he received 
monetary compensation as a result of his documentary about 
Pacifica.  (R. at 7.)  Any money amassed does nothing to remove 
9
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or lessen the constitutional injury that he has suffered.  The 
impairment of Ventura’s aesthetic enjoyment of Pacifica persists, 
and he remains unable to return there without the constant 
reminder of the personal injuries suffered by Garcia’s workers.  
These injuries suffice to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. 
 
2. Valdez’s memory loss and neurological damage are 
concrete injuries directly traceable to GRG and 
Newtown PTA’s shipment of container #VS2078. 
 
The requirement that a plaintiff’s injury be “fairly traceable” 
to the defendant’s conduct does not mean that he must show to a 
scientific certainty that the defendant’s actions alone caused the 
precise harm he suffered.  Pub. Interest Research Group v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990); cf. Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).  A 
plaintiff need not prove causation with absolute scientific rigor in 
order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, and the “fairly 
traceable” requirement is not equivalent to the standard 
necessary to show tort causation.  Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72.  
Additionally, if several parties are responsible for the alleged 
harm, a plaintiff need not sue every party in one action, as each 
has caused some part of the injury suffered.  Id.  The size of the 
injury is not germane to the standing analysis, and a “mere trifle” 
may suffice to satisfy the injury-in-fact standard.  SCRAP, 412 
U.S. at 689 n.14 (1973) (citation omitted). 
In Powell Duffryn, the Third Circuit addressed a bulk storage 
facility operating on the banks of a water channel in New Jersey.  
913 F.2d at 68-69.  The facility allegedly operated in violation of a 
permit required by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(“FWCPA”) and as a result caused harm to plaintiffs who used 
the channel.  Id.  While the permits allowed a limited amount of 
pollution, the plaintiffs alleged that the facility had repeatedly 
exceeded these limits.  Id. at 69.  In holding that the plaintiffs’ 
injuries were traceable to the pollutants emitted from the 
defendant’s storage facility, the court noted that the plaintiffs 
only needed to show that the defendants had discharged some 
pollutant in concentrations greater than allowed by its permit.  
Id. at 72.  As the plaintiffs had an interest that was or might be 
adversely affected by the pollutant, and the pollutant contributed 
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generally to the kinds of injuries the plaintiffs suffered, the court 
held that they had standing.  Id. 
Here, like the effluent originating from the bulk storage 
facility in Powell Duffryn, container #VS2078 contained high 
levels of mercury, lead and other toxic materials which 
contributed to both Valdez and Ventura’s injuries.  (R. at 5.)  
Container #VS2078 entered a “waterway” of containers all 
handled by Valdez.  (R. at 5-6.)  Valdez was directly exposed to 
mercury, lead, cadmium, chromium and other toxins originating 
from the containers he handled on a daily basis, including 
container #VS2078.  (R. at 5-6.)  Container #VS2078 was 
managed and processed by Garcia’s plant and its employees.  (R. 
at 5-6.)  The fact that Valdez’s injuries are of a type usually 
caused by lead and mercury poisoning creates a strong inference 
that his injuries were caused in part by GRG and Newtown PTA’s 
shipment of hazardous waste.  (R. at 6.)  As the standing 
causation threshold is lower than that required for a tort, Valdez 
has satisfied the Article III causation requirement. 
 
B. Valdez and Ventura Have Standing To Pursue Their 
Claims Under The Citizen Suit Provision of RCRA. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (“section 6972”) provides that “any 
person may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . against 
any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, 
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which has 
become effective pursuant to this Act.”  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A).  
A defendant’s current and ongoing activity at the site is not a 
prerequisite for finding a current and ongoing violation.  South 
Rd. Assocs. v. IBM, 216 F.3d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 2000).  Rather, the 
central question is whether the defendant’s actions, past or 
present, cause an ongoing violation of RCRA.  Id. 
 
1.  GRG and Newtown PTA violated RCRA, and therefore 
Valdez has the right to bring a claim under RCRA’s 
citizen suit provision. 
 
Congress intended through use of the term “any person” to 
confer RCRA standing to the full extent permitted by Article III.  
DMJ Assocs., LLC v. Capasso, 288 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 
11
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2003).  Section 6972 does not explicitly limit so-called citizen suits 
to United States citizens.  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A).  In the 
absence of any such limitation, Article III extends standing to 
foreign citizens bringing claims against United States citizens.  
U.S. Const. art. III.  Moreover, standing is designed to ensure 
that a plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of a 
controversy.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).  Foreign 
nationals like Valdez have a significant interest in seeing that 
RCRA is enforced, as RCRA explicitly regulates the export of 
hazardous waste to foreign countries whose citizens may be 
harmed by individuals who violate its requirements.  As a foreign 
citizen who has been harmed by GRG and Newtown PTA’s 
conduct, Valdez has standing to bring his claim under RCRA. 
 
2. GRG and Garcia’s actions satisfy the “to be in 
violation” requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). 
 
In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation, Inc., the Supreme Court interpreted the Clean Water 
Act’s citizen suit provision, which contains identical “to be in 
violation” language as that found in RCRA.  484 U.S. 49, 57 
(1987).  While the Court held that the Clean Water Act’s 
provision could not apply to “wholly past actions,” it 
acknowledged that the language is ambiguous and that the 
reasonable prospect of future pollution can impact the 
interpretation of the statute.  Id.  The most natural reading of “to 
be in violation” is that it requires citizen plaintiffs to allege a 
state of either continuous or intermittent violation—that is, a 
reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will pollute in the 
future and that the conduct complained of is continuing in 
nature.  Id.; McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. 
Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 1988). 
In South Road, South Road Associates (“SRA”), as landlord, 
sued IBM, the former lessee of its property, under the citizen suit 
provisions of RCRA, alleging that IBM’s storage of chemical 
wastes on the landlord’s property resulted in contamination of the 
surrounding soil, bedrock and groundwater, and amounted to a 
violation of RCRA’s open-dumping provisions.  216 F.3d at 252.  
However, because IBM was no longer the lessee of the property 
and therefore could not possibly effect any continuing violations, 
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the court held that SRA did not allege sufficient facts to satisfy 
RCRA’s causation requirement.  South Rd., 216 F.3d at 252.  
Similarly, in Weinberger, citizens who lived near an air force base 
owned by the Department of Defense alleged that the base’s 
practices and procedures with respect to industrial and domestic 
wastes violated various environmental laws.  707 F. Supp. at 
1185.  However, the conduct complained of, in particular the use 
of treated wastewater in the cooling towers, was discontinued one 
month prior to the filing of the complaint.  Id. at 1188.  With the 
conduct having officially ended, the court held that there was no 
reason to believe that the base intended to use treated 
wastewater in the cooling towers at any time in the future.  Id.  
The court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing.  Id. 
Here, Garcia’s extensive history of negligent waste 
operations and endangerment of employees makes it likely that 
he will continue to pollute in the future.  (R. at 6, 8.)  The facts in 
this case are distinguishable from South Road and Weinberger 
because GRG’s on-going contract with Garcia creates a real 
possibility that future containers of UEDs will be shipped to 
Pacifica in violation of RCRA.  The plaintiffs in South Road based 
their claims on violations that occurred entirely in the past, 
during the time when IBM was their lessee.  GRG and Garcia 
maintain an on-going relationship, evidenced by a contract with 
specified terms.  (R. at 8.)  Similarly, unlike the clear termination 
of the alleged unpermitted conduct in Weinberger, the contract 
between GRG and Garcia has not been terminated, only 
suspended due to the pendency of the current litigation.  (R. at 8.)  
An “open-ended contract” with a chronic polluter that has only 
halted operations due to litigation is not strong evidence that that 
polluter will stop violating RCRA.  Rather, it is a testament to the 
present and potential harm imposed on Valdez and Ventura due 
to GRG and Newtown PTA’s actions. 
Further, the ambiguity surrounding “to be in violation” 
allows this court to look at the  statute in its entirety as 
additional means of interpretation.  Unlike the “to be in violation” 
language of the Clean Water Act discussed in Gwaltney, the 
language and structure of the rest of the citizen suit provisions in 
section 6972 bolster the notion that the interest of the citizen 
plaintiff is not primarily forward-looking and can include past 
and present violations.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (An 
13
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individual may bring a suit “against any person, including any . . 
. past or present transporter . . . who has contributed or who is 
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste.”).  
The reasonable probability of future violation is the tipping point 
in qualifying GRG’s conduct as causing an injury-in-fact under 
RCRA. 
 
3. RCRA’s “cradle to grave” structure creates liability for 
all parties involved in the export of hazardous waste, 
linking GRG and Newtown PTA directly to Ventura 
and Valdez’s injuries. 
 
RCRA establishes a “cradle to grave” regulatory structure for 
the treatment, storage and disposal of solid and hazardous waste 
which governs the handling of the waste even at its most infant 
stages.  City of Chi. v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994).  
Under RCRA, the EPA has promulgated standards governing 
hazardous waste generators and transporters.  Id.  Numerous 
sections of RCRA focus on regulating the responsibilities of 
parties involved in the export of hazardous waste.  See e.g. 42 
U.S.C. § 6938 (2009) (requiring an exporter to “forward to the 
government of the receiving country a description of the Federal 
regulations which would apply to the treatment, storage, and 
disposal of the hazardous waste in the United States”). 
Here, GRG had a duty to see that its exported waste was 
handled with the same care and under the same regulatory 
structure as required by RCRA.  FRT and its members can bring 
a claim against GRG and Newtown PTA because the chain of 
causation leads directly from them to Garcia’s plant.  Had GRG 
and Newtown PTA not failed to comply with their legal 
obligations under RCRA’s export, notification and testing 
requirements, Ventura and Valdez would not have been harmed. 
 
4. The district court erred in holding that Valdez and 
Ventura’s injuries are not redressable by a favorable 
ruling from the court. 
 
The district court erred in holding that FRT and its members 
lacked standing because their injuries are not redressable by the 
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relief sought.  To satisfy the third prong of standing, it is 
necessary to prove that relief from the injury alleged is likely to 
follow from a favorable decision.  Wright, 468 U.S. at 751.  Here, 
above all, FRT seeks an injunction against further violations of 
RCRA.  An injunction will prevent any possible future injuries 
suffered by Valdez and Ventura and satisfy the redressability 
concerns.  Furthermore, at no point does RCRA explicitly set 
forth that compensatory damages cannot be sought in a citizen 
suit.  However, even if this court were to hold that compensatory 
damages are not authorized under RCRA, FRT and its members’ 
request for injunctive relief satisfies the redressability standing 
requirement. 
 
C. FRT Has Representational Standing to Bring Suit 
Based on the Injuries Suffered By Valdez and Ventura. 
 
Like the organizational plaintiffs in SCRAP, FRT relies on 
the alleged injuries flowing from the toxic waste of Garcia’s plant 
to its members who both worked directly within the plant and 
enjoyed Pacifica’s natural beauty.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that an association has standing to bring suit on 
behalf of its members when: (1) its members would otherwise 
have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks 
to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) 
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.  Hunt v. 
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 1  
Although the first two prongs of the test are constitutional in 
nature, the third is prudential.  United Food & Commer. Workers 
Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, 517 U.S. 544, 555 (1996).  
Further, the third prong is “best seen as focusing on matters of 
administrative convenience and efficiency, not on elements of a 
case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution.”  Id. 
at 557. 
                                                          
 1. The first prong of Hunt was outlined by the Supreme Court in Sierra 
Club v. Morton.  405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (holding that an organization whose 
members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial 
review).  Since Sierra Club, the Supreme Court has refined its requirements of 
representational standing and the Hunt factors therefore control here. 
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Here, both Valdez and Ventura have demonstrated sufficient 
injuries-in-fact to have standing to sue in their own right, thereby 
satisfying the first prong.  Moreover, FRT’s attempt to remedy 
these injuries is central to its purpose of protecting and 
enhancing responsible trade practices.  (R. Attach., Oct. 27, 2009).  
Both Ventura and Valdez are additional members of this suit and 
explicitly named as such, so the prudential concerns discussed in 
Brown Group do not exist here.  Dismissing FRT will not serve 
administrative efficiency, and so FRT has representational 
standing to bring this suit. 
II. THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE 
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT  FOR INJURIES 
RESULTING FROM THE EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS 
WASTE. 
The Alien Tort Claims Act states in full: “The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty 
of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).  A personal injury 
claim under the ATCA can be based on a defendant’s violation of 
a treaty which the United States has ratified.  Id.; Vietnam Ass’n 
for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104, 
118 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that as the United States had not 
ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol at the relevant time, the 
Protocol was not a “treaty” under the ATCA).  Alternatively, an 
ATCA claim can be based on a defendant’s violation of the “law of 
nations.”  28 U.S.C. § 1350.  The Supreme Court held in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain that the few international laws which may 
subject a defendant to ATCA tort liability consist mainly of 
proscriptions widely followed by the international community 
when the ATCA was enacted in the eighteenth century.  542 U.S. 
692, 720, 725 (2004) (noting that these violations included piracy, 
offenses against ambassadors and violation of safe conduct).  
“[A]ny claim based on the present-day law of nations [must] rest 
on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized 
world and defined with a specificity” comparable to the 
eighteenth century violations.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
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A.  The Illegal Export of Hazardous Waste Does Not 
Constitute a Violation of the Law of Nations or a Treaty 
of the United States. 
 
According to the Second Circuit, the law of nations “is 
composed only of those rules that States universally abide by, or 
accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.”  
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003).  
Parties must practice these rules out of a sense of legal 
obligation, not for moral or political reasons.  Id.  The 
international community must also be at least partially 
successful in implementing the legal regime in question, and any 
obligation “must be more than merely professed or aspirational.”  
Id. at 248. 
Treaties and agreements can provide evidence of widely-
practiced international legal obligations.  Beanal v. Free-port-
McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999).  However, 
treaties that impose obligations on state actors cannot be used as 
evidence of a private party’s individual liability under the ATCA.  
See Flores, 414 F.3d at 258 (holding that even if the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights created a rule 
of customary international law, “the rule would apply only to 
state actors because the provision addresses only ‘the steps to be 
taken by the State Parties’”).  The Fifth Circuit has also held that 
“the more States that have ratified a treaty, and the greater the 
relative influence of those States in international affairs, the 
greater the treaty’s evidentiary value.”  Flores, 414 F.3d at 257.  
Thus, a treaty that has not been ratified or enforced by the 
United States provides weaker evidence of United States 
adherence to international law than would a ratified or executed 
treaty.  Id. 2 
                                                          
 2. Appellees’ reliance on Sarei v. Rio Tinto plc is misplaced.  221 F. Supp. 2d 
1116, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Sarei I”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in 
part, 456 F.3d. 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 
487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), hearing en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 
2007), aff’d, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).  The original district court in Sarei 
held that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), a 
treaty not ratified by the United States but ratified by 166 other countries, 
established a “law of nations” under the ATCA.  Sarei’s long and convoluted 
history undermines this holding, and in fact, when the district court finally 
revisited its decision in 2009, it held that, at least for purposes of exhaustion 
under the ATCA, the plaintiffs’ “international environmental rights claims, 
17
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Most courts have refused to find environmental torts specific 
or universal enough to serve as the foundation for an ATCA 
claim.  See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 
7, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“In the developing area of international 
environmental law . . . nations have tended to treat protection of 
the environment on an ad-hoc . . . basis.”).  For instance, the Fifth 
Circuit in Beanal rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the 
defendant’s mining activities, which allegedly violated 
international environmental standards, gave rise to ATCA 
liability.  197 F.3d at 166-67.  That court noted that the 
international agreements the plaintiff relied on were primarily 
aspirational, reflecting “a general sense of environmental 
responsibility and [stating] abstract rights and liberties.”  Id. at 
167; see also Flores, 414 F.3d at 256 (holding that plaintiff’s 
citation to aspirational environmental international treaties, 
conventions and covenants did not show that those instruments 
established a “law of nations”). 
Here, the district court correctly concluded that GRG and 
Newtown PTA did not violate any treaty of the United States so 
as to create ATCA liability.  (R. at 9-10.)  Valdez incorrectly cited 
to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Waste and Disposal (“Basel 
Convention”), a treaty that the United States has not ratified.  (R. 
at 9.)3  Also, although the OECD Hazardous Waste Decision-
Recommendation cited by Valdez directs member countries’ 
governments to implement controls on the export of hazardous 
waste, it does not impose any legal obligations on private parties.  
(R. at 9.)4  Thus, GRG and Newtown PTA could not violate the 
OECD’s requirements.  Furthermore, these documents by 
themselves do not create a “law of nations” which either GRG or 
Newtown PTA could violate.  The district court acted consistently 
                                                                                                                                       
including those premised on the UNCLOS, involve norms ‘where aspiration has 
not yet ripened into obligation.’”  Sarei v. Tio Tinto plc, No. CV 00-11695 MMM 
(MANx), 2009 WL 2762635, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2009) (citation omitted). 
 3. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited 
with the Secretary-General, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ ParticipationStatus 
.aspx (follow “Chapter XXVII” hyperlink; then follow “Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. 
Basel, 22 March 1989” hyperlink). 
 4. See Decision-Recommendation of the Council on Exports of Hazardous 
Wastes from the OECD Area, 5 June 1986 – C(86)64/Final, http://webdomino1. 
oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(86)64. 
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with Beanal in holding that any potential “law of nations” created 
by the OECD Hazardous Waste Decision-Recommendation would 
apply only to state actors rather than private parties.  (R. at 9)  
Under the reasoning in Flores, the United States’ refusal to ratify 
the Basel Convention, despite its ratification by 121 countries, 
significantly undermines any claim that the Convention creates 
widely-followed international obligations.  (R. at 9.)  The Sosa 
court strongly emphasized its hesitation to expand ATCA liability 
in the absence of a clear violation of well-settled international 
law.  Valdez has failed to show that his claim implicates any such 
well-settled law. 
 
B.  RCRA, and the EPA’s Implementation Thereof, Regulates 
the Export of Hazardous Waste So Extensively that 
Recognizing an ATCA Cause of Action Would Be 
Improper. 
 
The Sosa Court instructed federal courts to exercise restraint 
when deciding whether to recognize a new cause of action under 
the ATCA, emphasizing the importance of looking for “legislative 
guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive 
law.”  542 U.S. at 724-26.  The ATCA authorizes federal courts in 
very limited circumstances to use well-established customary 
international law as the basis for an ATCA cause of action.  Sosa, 
542 U.S. at 725.  Courts must be careful, however, not to override 
or interfere with properly enacted and executed federal law 
dealing with the same subject matter.  Id. at 731 (noting that 
Congress may remove ATCA jurisdiction “explicitly, or implicitly 
by treaties or statutes that occupy the field”). 
The Supreme Court has shown deference to congressionally-
enacted and EPA-executed environmental regulations when 
deciding whether to recognize a cause of action outside of the 
enacted regulatory scheme.  See Middlesex County Sewerage 
Auth. V. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).  The 
plaintiffs in Sea Clammers were fishermen and clammers who 
sued several governmental entities under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, claiming that those entities were 
discharging sewage into New York Harbor and the Hudson River.  
The Sea Clammers Court held that the FWCPA’s enforcement 
provisions, which were “unusually elaborate,” supplanted “any 
19
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remedy that might otherwise be available under [section] 1983,” 
which authorizes citizens to sue municipalities for violating 
federal law.  Id. at 13, 19-21.  The FWCPA’s regulatory 
framework allows the EPA to “respond to violations of the Act 
with compliance orders and civil suits,” and it empowers the 
Administrator to “seek a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per day,” 
as well as criminal penalties.  Id. at 13-14.  These direct 
enforcement mechanisms are “supplemented by express citizen-
suit provisions.”  Id.  Individuals invoking the citizen-suit 
provisions must comply with specified procedures, in particular a 
requirement of sixth days’ prior notice to defendants.  Sea 
Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13-14.5 
RCRA’s regulations governing the export of hazardous waste 
are nearly identical to the FWCPA regulations at issue in Sea 
Clammers.  Under RCRA, the EPA Administrator may directly 
issue compliance orders and assess civil penalties of $25,000 per 
day as long as the violation continues.  42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) 
(2006).  The Administrator may also sue in federal court seeking 
these civil penalties or an injunction.  42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1).  
Furthermore, like the FWCPA regulations in Sea Clammers, 
RCRA authorizes citizen suits, but imposes strict procedural 
limitations on those suits.  42 U.S.C. § 6972.  Any citizen suing 
under RCRA must notify the EPA, the state in which the 
violation occurred and the violator sixty days prior to serving a 
complaint.  42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(A).  The EPA may intervene as 
a matter of right in any such lawsuit.  42 U.S.C. § 6972(d).  
Furthermore, no citizen may sue under section 6972 if the EPA or 
a state has already commenced an action against an alleged 
violator.  42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(A).  On top of all this, the EPA 
                                                          
 5. The Court in Smith v. Robinson also precluded a section 1983 cause of 
action to enforce handicapped childrens’ constitutional right to a public 
education “in light of the comprehensive nature of the procedures and 
guarantees set out” in the Education of the Handicapped Act.  468 U.S. 992, 
1011-13 (1984). The Supreme Court has applied similar reasoning to SEC 
antitrust regulations.  The doctrine of implied immunity shields regulated 
entities from liability under general antitrust laws when Congress grants 
“pervasive supervisory authority” to the SEC to implement a regulatory scheme, 
and the SEC approves activities normally banned by the antitrust laws.  United 
States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 733-34 (1975).  This rule 
insures “that the federal agency entrusted with regulation in the public interest 
[can] carry out that responsibility free from the disruption of conflicting 
judgments that might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under the 
antitrust laws.”  Id. at 734-35. 
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itself has issued extensive regulations governing the export of 
hazardous waste.  See 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.50-58 (2009); 40 C.F.R. §§ 
262.80-262.89 (2009).  As in Sea Clammers, this extensive and 
procedurally detailed set of regulations strongly indicates that 
Congress intended for RCRA to occupy the field of hazardous 
waste exports.  This court should follow Sea Clammers and Sosa 
and refuse to create a duplicative and potentially disruptive 
ATCA cause of action. 
 
C.  Recognizing an ATCA Cause of Action for the Illegal 
Export of Hazardous Waste Would Interfere with the 
Executive Branch’s Management of Foreign Affairs. 
 
The need for courts to exercise caution in recognizing a new 
cause of action is particularly important in the context of the 
ATCA, in order that they avoid “impinging on the discretion of 
the Legislative and Executive branches in managing foreign 
affairs.”  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) 
(counseling that expansion of ATCA liability would be “contrary . 
. . to the appropriate, indeed the constitutional, role of courts with 
respect to foreign affairs”). 
The EPA’s regulations categorically prohibit the export of 
hazardous waste to non-OECD countries such as Sud-Americano 
unless the receiving country has agreed to accept that waste, and 
the hazardous waste shipment conforms to the terms of the 
receiving country’s written consent.  40 C.F.R. § 262.50.  (R. 
Attach., Oct. 16, 2009).  Furthermore, nothing in RCRA prevents 
a foreign national from suing a United States entity that violates 
its export requirements.  Recognizing an ATCA cause of action 
based on an injury caused by the shipment of hazardous waste to 
a non-OECD country, however, could lead a foreign national to 
bring a claim in federal court even though the shipment in 
question was approved by that individual’s government.  
Providing a federal forum that allows foreign nationals to 
circumvent the policies of their home governments would 
undermine the United States’ international relationships.  As the 
Supreme Court emphasized in Sosa, this court should hesitate 
before extending ATCA liability when doing so would interfere 
with the Executive Branch’s management of foreign affairs. 
21
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III. EVEN IF VALDEZ AND VENTURA DO NOT HAVE 
STANDING, RCRA  PROVIDES THE EPA WITH A 
SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR 
JURISDICTION THAT JUSITIFIES ITS 
CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT IN THIS  ACTION. 
 
District courts have discretion to treat an intervenor’s 
pleading as a separate action.  Atkins, 418 F.3d at 875-76.  For 
example, the Fourth Circuit in Atkins allowed the parents of 
school children to intervene in a lawsuit attempting to compel 
North Carolina to provide a racially integrated school system, 
even after the district court dismissed the original plaintiff’s 
complaint for lack of standing.  Id.; see also Fuller v. Volk, 351 
F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 1965) (remanding for inquiry into whether 
intervening plaintiff parents had standing to challenge a plan to 
redraw school attendance lines after finding that original 
plaintiffs did not).  The district court, before exercising its 
discretion, must show that the intervenor has a “separate and 
independent basis for jurisdiction.”  Fuller, 351 F.3d at 329; cf. 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986).  Once this is done, 
allowing the intervenor to continue the lawsuit is appropriate 
where “failure to adjudicate the claim will result only in 
unnecessary delay.”  Fuller, 351 F.3d at 329. 
 
A. The EPA Has an Independent Basis for Jurisdiction. 
 
To determine whether a federal agency has a separate and 
independent basis for jurisdiction, this court must look to that 
agency’s governing statute.  See Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 
F.2d 669, 677 (5th Cir. 1985).  In Amoco, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), 
after intervening in a lawsuit brought by four African American 
employees against Amoco, could continue litigating against the 
company even after the employees settled.  Id. at 672, 674.  The 
Amoco court reasoned that the 1972 amendments to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 expressly granted the EEOC a right to bring 
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suit under its own name under certain conditions, which the 
court held had been met.  Id. at 677. 
The First Circuit dealt with the opposite situation in Ruotolo 
v. Ruotolo.  572 F.2d 336 (1st Cir. 1978).  In Ruotolo, the United 
States intervened in a bankruptcy proceeding after a creditor 
moved to disqualify the debtor’s counsel under section 39b of the 
Bankruptcy Act (“section 39b”).  572 F.2d at 337.  The United 
States intervened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 and Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 24(b), which gives district courts discretion to 
allow an agency to intervene “when a party’s claim or defense is 
based on . . . a statute or executive order administered by the . . . 
agency.”  Id. at 338; 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).  
The United States argued that the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts (the “Office of the Courts”) satisfied the 
Rule 24(b) criteria.  Ruotolo, 527 F.3d at 338 n.2.  Several months 
before the district court handed down its decision, however, the 
creditor withdrew its objection, leaving the United States as the 
only party disputing section 39b’s application.  Id. at 338.  The 
court subsequently held that because nothing in the statutory 
provisions establishing the Office of the Courts authorized it to 
enforce bankruptcy laws, the United States did not have standing 
to challenge the application of section 39(b).  Id. at 338 n.3, 339.  
In fact, the United States was unable “to point to [any] 
independent source of authority permitting it to sue on behalf of 
itself or on behalf of others, in order to enforce the provisions of 
[s]ection 39b.”  Id. at 338 n.2, 339. 
Here, Congress expressly authorized the EPA Administrator 
to file an enforcement action in federal courts under RCRA.  42 
U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1).  The Ruotolo court rejected the Office of the 
Court’s standing in large part because the agency as intervenor 
was unable to show any statutory authority permitting it to sue 
anyone.  However, as in Amoco, the EPA here has explicit 
statutory authorization to sue private parties.  It may sue for 
injunctive relief and civil damages.  42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), (g).  As 
RCRA expressly authorizes the EPA to sue GRG and Newtown 
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B. The District Court’s Decision to Allow the EPA to 
Continue this Litigation  Avoids Unnecessary Delay and 
Expense. 
 
In exercising their discretion to allow an intervenor to 
remain after the initial parties have stopped litigating, courts 
emphasize the need to avoid unnecessary delay and expense.  See 
Fuller, 351 F.3d at 329.  As the Fuller court aptly stated, “[b]y 
allowing the suit to continue with respect to the intervening 
party, the court can avoid the senseless ‘delay and expense of a 
new suit, which at long last will merely bring the parties to the 
point where they are now.’”  Id. (quoting Hackner v. Guaranty 
Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 1941)).  The Fifth Circuit has 
also noted how unreasonable dismissing a lawsuit would be when 
the intervenor can simply file a new lawsuit.  Amoco, 768 F.2d at 
678.  That court said that the EEOC, after “having devoted the 
resources of five and one-half years to adjudicating its own claims 
of employment discrimination against Amoco, would be returned 
to square one.”  Id.  The Amoco court also emphasized that given 
the length of the already transpired litigation, Amoco was not 
“without notice of the charges upon which the Commission’s 
claims [were] based.”  Id. 
Here, Congress authorized the EPA to intervene in RCRA 
citizen suits “as a matter of right.”  42 U.S.C. § 6972(d).  Courts 
must “permit anyone to intervene who . . . is given an 
unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 24(a).  This authorization evidences Congress’ intent to 
give the EPA a strong mechanism to enforce RCRA.  A dismissal 
of this lawsuit would impede the EPA’s enforcement efforts and 
would come at the expense of the public, wasting the resources of 
both the United States, as intervenor, and the courts.  Like the 
defendant in Amoco, GRG and Newtown PTA are well aware of 
the EPA’s claims, and allowing the EPA to continue this suit 
would not result in prejudice against them.  Furthermore, GRG 
and Newtown PTA in this case appear to concede that the EPA 
has an independent basis to bring suit against them, as they 
argued before the district court that the EPA was “free to bring 
its own separate civil or criminal enforcement actions at any 
time.”  (R. at 3.)  If GRG and Newtown PTA know that the United 
States will be able to bring a new action if dismissed from this 
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one, they can only be trying to buy themselves time and perhaps 
a settlement.  As the Amoco and Fuller courts noted, this would 
simply return the parties to where they were prior to the district 
court’s order.  Such a result is manifestly inefficient and unjust. 
 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
THE CONTENTS OF  CONTAINER #VS2078 WERE 
SOLID WASTE UNDER RCRA. 
 
RCRA is a “comprehensive environmental statute that 
governs the treatment, storage and disposal of solid and 
hazardous waste.”  Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 483.  RCRA carefully 
regulates all stages in the life of hazardous waste in order to 
prevent harm to the environment and humans from toxic 
substances.  Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1178-79 
(D.C. Cir. 1987).  Specifically, RCRA prohibits the export of 
hazardous waste unless the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 6938 are 
met.  Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 674 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).  Section 6938 requires that an exporter notify 
the EPA prior to exporting hazardous waste and that the 
receiving country consent in writing to the proposed export.  42 
U.S.C. §§ 6938(c), (a)(1)(B); 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.52(a), (c).  These 
constraints pertain to any export of hazardous waste as defined 
by RCRA.  Id.  Under 40 C.F.R. § 261 (“section 261”), a two-
pronged test is employed to determine if material is hazardous 
waste: (1) the material must be solid waste, and (2) the material 
must be toxic.  40 C.F.R. § 261 (2009); Amlon Metals, 775 F. 
Supp. at 674; Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington 
Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1313 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 
A. The Contents of Container #VS2078 Were Solid Waste 
Under the Test  Promulgated by the EPA. 
 
According to the Second Circuit, dual definitions of solid 
waste are suggested by RCRA, and the EPA’s regulations 
“reasonably interpret the statutory language.”  Cordiano v. 
Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2009).  Where 
Congress has not directly addressed a precise question in drafting 
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legislation, a court should defer to the appropriate agency’s 
permissible construction of that statute.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  
Under the EPA’s implementation of RCRA, solid waste is defined 
as “discarded material,” meaning any material that is 
“‘abandoned’ by being ‘[d]isposed of.’”  Cordiano, 575 F.3d at 206 
(citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b)).  Material recycled in a manner that 
amounts to disposal is solid waste.  40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(1) . 
RCRA does exempt certain toxic solid waste from regulation.  
Am. Mining Cong., 824 F.2d at 1180; 40 C.F.R. § 261.  This 
exemption applies where “materials are used to manufacture new 
products,” such as in the case of a manufacturing plant with on-
site recycling.  Am. Mining Cong., 824 F.2d at 1180; 40 C.F.R. § 
261.6.  The EPA also explicitly exempts certain items from RCRA, 
including cathode ray tubes (“CRTs”).  40 C.F.R. § 261.39-41.  
CRTs have a similar composition to UEDs, specifically with 
regards to their toxic makeup, but are not considered solid waste 
under RCRA.  40 C.F.R. § 261.39.  However, even those CRTs 
exempt under section 261.39 are considered solid waste when 
they are “speculatively accumulated.”  40 C.F.R.§ 261.4(a)(22)(i).  
According to section 261, material is “speculatively accumulated” 
if it is “accumulated before being recycled.”  40 C.F.R. § 
261.1(c)(8).  Finally, a company accumulating such materials 
must meet EPA notification standards in order to be exempt from 
RCRA’s solid waste regulations.  Id. 
Here, the contents of container #VS2078 qualify as solid 
waste under RCRA because they were “disposed of.”  The UEDs 
in container #VS2078 are discarded materials because they were 
given to GRG for no compensation when the owners no longer 
wanted them.  (R. at 4-5.)  While GRG calls itself a recycling 
service, not all UEDs that it ships abroad are recycled or even 
usable.  (R. at 4.)  Only half of the UEDs, by volume, are 
salvaged.  (R. at 5.)  That half are salvaged indicates that the 
other half are disposed of and qualify as solid waste.  (R. at 5.)  In 
fact, some of the salvaged UEDs are mined for small amounts of 
precious metals, which is use constituting disposal.  (R. at 5.)  
Thus, the UEDs donated to GRG and Newtown PTA are solid 
waste under the regulatory definition of 40 C.F.R. § 261.2.  (R. at 
5-6.) 
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Furthermore, even if the contents of container #VS2078 are 
considered “recycled,” they qualify as solid waste.  The recycling 
exception set out in 40 C.F.R. § 261.6 is inapplicable here.  Garcia 
is not in the business of manufacturing, and therefore the 
contents of container #VS2078 do not qualify for the 
manufacturing exception for recyclable material.  (R. at 5.)  In 
fact, the absence of an explicit exemption for UEDs under RCRA, 
while CRTs with a similar composition are exempt, is strong 
evidence that UEDs fall within the scope of RCRA’s regulations.  
(R. at 5.)  Finally, even if the CRT exemption applied to the 
contents of container #VS2078, the UEDs were “speculatively 
accumulated” materials, because GRG accumulated them before 
shipment.  (R. at 5.)  GRG did not communicate with the EPA 
about container #VS2078 as required, so made no showing to the 
EPA that might exclude the UEDs from being classified as 
“speculatively accumulated.”  (R. at 5.)  Thus, even if the UEDs in 
container #VS2078 are given the same preferential treatment as 
CRTs, or are construed to be recycled, they were speculatively 
accumulated and must be solid waste. 
 
B.  GRG and Newtown PTA Are Liable for the Contents of 
Container #VS2078  Regardless of the Location to Which 
the Container Was Shipped. 
 
The contents of container #VS2078 did not lose their 
classification as solid waste simply because they were shipped 
abroad.  “RCRA . . . empowers [the] EPA to regulate hazardous 
wastes from cradle to grave.”  City of Chi., 511 U.S. at 331.  In 
holding otherwise, the court below erroneously relied on EEOC v. 
Arabian American Oil Company, in which the Supreme Court 
evaluated whether claims of employment discrimination could be 
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for discriminatory 
conduct that took place in Saudi Arabia.  499 U.S. 244, 246 
(1991).  The Court indicated that the extraterritorial application 
of United States civil rights laws in a foreign workplace could 
create conflicts with foreign law.  Id. at 256-57.  Because the 
conduct complained of occurred entirely outside of the United 
States, the Court deferred to the law of Saudi Arabia.  Id. at 246, 
257-58. 
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Similarly, the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York held that when a RCRA violation occurs entirely outside of 
the United States, liability should not be extended under RCRA.  
Amlon Metals, 775 F. Supp. at  675-76.  In that case, Amlon 
Metals, a New York based corporation, shipped toxic materials to 
a corporation in the United Kingdom for drying and other 
processing.  Amlon Metals, 775 F. Supp. at 669.  The plaintiffs in 
Amlon Metals sought injunctive relief to prevent the imminent 
and substantial danger from toxic chemicals leaking out of Amlon 
Metals’ containers, which were stored in the United Kingdom.  Id. 
at 672.  As the violation occurred entirely outside of the United 
States, the district court held that “RCRA [did] not extend to 
waste located within the territory of another sovereign nation.”  
Id. 
The Second Circuit’s Leasco test, on the other hand, is 
applicable where the majority of the activities that are the subject 
of the complaint occur within the United States.  See Leasco Data 
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 
1972).  Under the Leasco test, if sufficient violative conduct 
occurs within the United States, the fact that some conduct 
occurred outside of the country will not preclude the application 
of federal law.  Id. 
The analysis used in Arabian American Oil does not apply 
here.  While this court should not impose regulations on Sud-
Americano, the RCRA violations occurred within the United 
States before container #VS2078 was shipped to Sud-Americano.  
(R. at 5.)  Moreover, Sud-Americano has no regulatory scheme 
governing UED recycling or the pollution from such recycling, so 
there is no conflict of laws.  (R. at 5.)  Unlike the potential 
international conflict the Arabian American Oil Court sought to 
avoid, here, international relations will likely be improved if solid 
waste exports from the United States are regulated. 
Although the Leasco test has not been widely applied 
subsequent to its creation by the Second Circuit, it is the 
appropriate standard under this specific set of facts.  Unlike 
Amlon Metals, GRG and Newtown PTA’s liability arises directly 
from their failure to comply with RCRA requirements pertaining 
to the disposal of hazardous waste.  (R. at 5.)  Where solid waste 
is created and gathered for disposal or recycling in the United 
States in a manner that violates RCRA, the location of its 
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ultimate disposal should not preclude the application of federal 
law.  Solid waste simply does not change its fundamental nature 
when it crosses a man-made border. 
The district court appropriately held that the contents of 
container #VS2078 were solid waste under RCRA jurisdiction 
while the container was in the United States.  (R. at 12.)  That 
Amlon Metals does not extend RCRA to waste entirely outside of 
the United States does not preclude liability in this case, because 
GRG’s permitting and regulatory violations occurred within 
United States borders.  (R. at 5.)  RCRA is designed to control 
hazardous waste from “cradle to grave,” and should not be 
circumvented merely because the ultimate destination of that 
illegally handled solid waste is outside of the United States.  The 
regulation is cradle to grave, not cradle to border. 
 
V. THE SOLID WASTE IN CONTAINER #VS2078 WAS 
HAZARDOUS WASTE, AND GRG AND NEWTOWN 
PTA ARE THUS LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH RCRA’S EXPORT REGULATIONS. 
 
After establishing that material is solid waste, the next step 
in evaluating if material is hazardous waste subject to RCRA is to 
determine whether that waste is toxic.  Conn. Coastal, 989 F.2d 
at 1313.  40 C.F.R. § 261.24 provides the minimum concentrations 
of contaminants for solid waste to qualify as toxic, and therefore 
hazardous, waste.  40 C.F.R. § 261.24. 
 
A. The Contents of Container #VS2078 Were Toxic. 
 
40 C.F.R. § 262.11 requires that a generator of solid waste 
must determine if that waste is hazardous.  40 C.F.R. § 262.11.  
In United States v. Dee, the Fourth Circuit held that failing to 
label hazardous waste was a crime under RCRA, and that 
knowledge of RCRA regulations was not a prerequisite for guilt.  
912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990).  As the court aptly stated, 
“[i]gnorance of the law is no defense.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
Furthermore, the EPA recommends that when an entity fails to 
test solid waste according to RCRA standards, and that solid 
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waste is known to contain toxins, the solid waste should be 
presumed hazardous.  See Complaint, Compliance Order and 
Notice of Opportunity for Hearing, In the matter of Earthecycle, 
LLC, EPA Docket No. RCRA-HQ-2009-0001 (July 5, 2009) 
(“Earthecycle”). 
GRG and Newtown PTA were required by section 262.11 to 
determine if the material in container #VS2078 was toxic, and 
their failure to do so should not benefit them.  Before placing 
UEDs in a container for shipment, Newtown PTA members 
performed no more than a visual examination to make sure the 
UEDs were intact.  (R. at 5.)  GRG failed to make the required 
determination whether the contents of container #VS2078 were 
hazardous.  (R. at 5.) 
In addition to MyPhones, many other UEDs photographed in 
container #VS2078 have tested as toxic.6  In a study performed by 
the Department of Environmental Engineering Sciences at the 
University of Florida, UEDs were tested specifically to see if they 
met the RCRA regulatory definition of toxic to qualify as 
hazardous waste.  Townsend, at viii.  Computers, computer 
components, cell phones and televisions of different brands were 
tested.  Townsend, at viii.  Every laptop computer, computer 
monitor and computer mouse tested as toxic, as well as at least 
half of the cell phones and desktop computers.  Townsend, at 5-1. 
This court should follow the EPA’s recommendation and hold 
that when an entity fails to test solid waste for toxicity, that solid 
waste should be presumed hazardous.  GRG’s failure to abide by 
RCRA’s regulatory standards sufficiently creates civil liability.  If 
untested solid waste were not presumed to be toxic, entities that 
know or have reason to believe solid waste is toxic would have 
incentive to violate RCRA and fail to test that solid waste.  
According to the tests performed in the Townsend study, the 
UEDs that filled container #VS2078 would fail the toxicity test of 
section 261.24.  (R. at 5.)  A significant number of MyPhones were 
shipped in container #VS2078.  (R. at 5.)  MyPhones would likely 
fail RCRA’s toxicity test due to their toxic mercury-lithium 
batteries and the presence of lead and other toxins.  (R. at 5.)  
                                                          
 6. See Timothy G. Townsend, RCRA Toxicity Characterization of CPUs and 
Other Discarded Electrical Devices (2004), http://www.ees.ufl.edu/  (search 
“RCRA Toxicity Characterization of CPUs”; then follow “RCRA Toxicity 
Characterization of CPUs and Other...” hyperlink.) (“Townsend”). 
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Although the contents shipped in container #VS2078 are no 
longer available for testing, that the items shipped are known to 
regularly fail RCRA toxicity tests strongly implies that the 
contents of container #VS2078 would qualify as toxic. 
 
B. The Contents of Container #VS2078 Did Not Qualify for 
the EPA’s  “Household Waste” Exclusion. 
 
Regardless of the toxicity, some solid waste is not considered 
hazardous waste under RCRA.  40 C.F.R.§ 261.4(b)(1).  Section 
261.4 provides that material “derived from households” is not 
hazardous waste.  Id.  In City of Chicago, the Supreme Court 
explained this exception: “[A]lthough most household waste is 
harmless, a small portion—such as cleaning fluids and 
batteries—would [qualify] as hazardous waste.”  511 U.S. at 332-
33. 
Here, container #VS2078 was filled entirely with the “small 
portion” of household waste that would otherwise qualify as 
hazardous waste.  (R. at 5.)  GRG officials indicated that “the 
bulk of the container” was comprised of toxic MyPhones.  (R. at 
5.)  In addition to the toxic MyPhones, container #VS2078 
included intact pagers and laptops, which very likely contained 
toxic batteries.  (R. at 5.)  Household waste is excluded under 
section 261.4 because of the typically low concentration of toxic 
materials.  Here, the entire container was filled with UEDs, 
which the Supreme Court acknowledged would otherwise qualify 
as hazardous waste.  (R. at 5.)  Section 261.4 should not be 
misconstrued to allow exclusion for the disposal of such a high 
concentration of toxic materials. 
Furthermore, the UEDs in container #VS2078 do not qualify 
as household waste, because they were not used in homes.  (R. at 
5.)  A photograph of the contents from container #VS2078 shows 
three laptops labeled “Property of the United States 
Government.”  (R. at 13.)  The United States Government does 
not meet the definition of “household” provided by section 261.4.  
Moreover, many of the MyPhones in container #VS2078 were still 
in their original packaging.  (R. at 5.)  MyPhones that have not 
been removed from their packaging were not used in homes and 
cannot be classified as household waste.  The MyPhone corporate 
headquarters is in Newtown, so it is likely that, in addition to not 
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being used in a home, these MyPhones were never even in a home 
at all.  (R. at 5.) 
Individuals leaving their UEDs with Newtown PTA signed a 
form indicating that the UEDs had been used in their homes and 
were no longer useful.  (R. at 5.)  Given the presence of 
government laptops and unopened MyPhones in container 
#VS2078, this form seems to have been no more than a formality.  
The district court mistakenly relied on this meaningless form in 
finding that the character of the container as a whole was 
household waste.  (R. at 13.)  In fact, the extremely high 
concentration of hazardous waste in container #VS2078, 
combined with the fact that it was not purely household waste, 
indicates that the exclusion provided by the EPA for household 
waste is inapplicable to container #VS2078.  The character of 
container #VS2078 was non-household hazardous waste. 
 
C. GRG and Newtown PTA Must Abide By RCRA’s 
Regulations Regardless of Whether GRG Is a Collector or 
a Generator of Waste. 
 
“Considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer, and [to] the principle of deference to administrative 
interpretations.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.  Understanding that 
the Supreme Court requires that deference be afforded to 
administrative agencies, this court should carefully examine 
enforcement actions by the EPA in factually similar matters.  See 
Complaint, Earthecycle, EPA Docket No. RCRA-HQ-2009-0001.  
In Earthecycle, the EPA asserted its authority to regulate 
hazardous waste “generators, transporters, and the owners and 
operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal 
facilities.”  Id. at 2.  Even though Earthecycle did not generate 
solid waste, but merely collected and exported it for recycling, the 
EPA asserted that Earthecycle was liable for failure to determine 
if the waste it processed, which was typically hazardous, met 
RCRA’s toxicity test.  Id. at 7-8.  The EPA also alleged that 
Earthecycle was liable for unauthorized export of hazardous 
waste, failure to provide notice of intent to export and for failure 
to package, label and mark the hazardous waste according to 
RCRA’s requirements.  Id. at 8-10. 
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Here, GRG did no more than fill out customs documents for 
the contents of container #VS2078.  (R. at 5.)  As in Earthecycle, 
GRG failed to satisfy any of the export requirements imposed by 
the EPA’s regulations and RCRA.  The EPA’s enforcement of 
RCRA’s regulations in Earthecycle should be granted deference.  
Just like Earthecycle, even though GRG was not the generator of 
hazardous waste, GRG and Newtown PTA accumulated 
hazardous waste and shipped it abroad.  (R. at 5.)  GRG and 
Newtown PTA are liable for their failure to comply with RCRA’s 
export requirements regarding the shipment of container 
#VS2078 to Sud-Americano. 
CONCLUSION 
Valdez, Ventura, the FRT and the EPA have properly 
brought this claim against GRG and Newtown PTA for their 
flagrant violation of RCRA’s restrictions on the export of 
hazardous waste.  Their violations should not go unpunished 
based on the district court’s improper interpretation of both 
Article III and RCRA.  However, this court should not create a 
cause of action under the ATCA when none has previously been 
recognized.  RCRA and the EPA’s implementing regulations 
suffice, and an ATCA cause of action would be inappropriate and 
duplicative.  Moreover, while the district court appropriately 
found the contents of container #VS2078 to be solid waste, it 
failed to properly identify that solid waste as hazardous waste 
under RCRA.  For the foregoing reasons, the EPA respectfully 
requests that this court AFFIRM the decision of the district court 
rejecting Valdez’s claim under the ATCA, and REVERSE the 
decision of the district court with respect to GRG and Newtown 
PTA’s liability under RCRA. 
 
 
 
 
33
